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When thinking about race there is a tendency to combineinto a single package two distinct cultural practices: oneracialist, the other racist. On the one hand, peopleeffortlessly (or seemingly effortlessly) partition humansinto categories based on differences in external anatomy.
On the other hand, people use these categories to rationalize inequitable
distributions of valued resources, power, and authority. That people en-
gage in these practices is uncontroversial. What is contentious is the
relationship between racialist and racist modes of thought, which might
be called the conceptual politics of race. Psychologists, who are principally
concerned with the organization of mental life, tend to view racial catego-
ries as the unmediated outcome of discontinuity in human phenotype
encountering a spontaneous impulse to categorize similar things together.
Of course, psychologists do not deny that representations of race play a
role in the rationalization of domination and of inequity. But they tend to
view this role as a by-product of the way that racial representations are
mentally formed. On such a view, race is a category of power because it is
a category of mind. In contrast, anthropologists, historians, sociologists,
and political scientists—that is, those scholars most concerned with race
as a category of power—argue that the partitioning of humans into racial
categories is contingent on and derived from the particular ways power
and authority are articulated in specific systems of domination. In this
view, race is a category of mind because it is a category of (certain) power
relations.
Both these approaches clearly have merit, and one might be tempted
to adopt an eclectic reconciliation if not for one thing. Neither provides
much insight into arguably the most significant aspect of racial thinking,
the capacity of a system that simply represents human difference to
underwrite judgments about the intrinsic value and potential of those
groups represented. Thus, although thought to be directly derived from
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the visible, race invariably entails powerful claims about the invisible. It
is in virtue of these explanatory claims that race serves to organize and
regulate relations of power and authority. Neither traditional psychologi-
cal nor comparative approaches provide purchase onto how it is that this
happens since neither provides much insight into why people move so
readily from the external to the internal. Indeed, both approaches situate
the move outside racial discourse, despite its centrality to that discourse.
What permits racial thinking—that complex of conceptual practices
and attitudes surrounding the social performance of sortings on a racial
dimension—to make the move from the external to the internal, to make
the move from a system for representing difference to one for explaining
it? At base, it is the willingness to apply essentialist reasoning to race.
Virtually all systems of racial thinking share a commitment to essential-
ism, a commitment to the notion that members of any particular group
share a common essence that underlies the group's nature and develop-
ment. Although psychologists and comparativists differ on how essential-
ism becomes mapped onto racial thinking, they agree that it involves the
recruitment of an idea or process extrinsic to racial thinking. Thus, for
psychologically minded scholars essentialism is not part of racial thinking
but emerges out of processes that ensure mental economy, while for
anthropologists and historians racial essentialism develops out of the
articulation of racialist thinking with biological thinking.
I will suggest, to the contrary, that an adequate analysis must account
for this essential, and essentializing, quality from within racial thinking
itself. Indeed, I believe that such an analytic move will require a fairly
modest shift in analytic strategy, one that involves reinterpreting the
relationship between race as a category of mind and race as a category of
power. We need simply to turn each approach on its head. On the one
hand, contrary to conventional wisdom in psychology, racial thinking is
intimately, not incidentally, linked to power. On the other hand, contrary
to conventional wisdom in the comparative disciplines, racial thinking is
readily recruited as an index of power relations precisely because it is a
very specific turn of mind. In short, race is not a category of mind because
it is a category of power, nor is it a category of power because it is a general
category of mind. Instead, race is a category of power because it is a
singular, unique category of mind.
U K PSYCHOLOGICAL VIRSUS COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF RACE
In the main, psychologists' interest in race focuses on the underlying
mental processes that give rise to racial cognitions and biases. To be sure,
psychologists have proposed noncognitive mechanisms. For instance, it
has been argued that racism is a projection of psychodynamic tensions
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intrinsic to certain personality types or that it is the outcome of certain
child-rearing practices that inhibit the resolution of inherent childhood
conflicts (Adorno et al. 1950). Increasingly, however, a consensus has
emerged in psychology that the race concept and racial biases are by-
products of the way humans process information. In this view, the race
concept follows from general features of categorization. Racial bias in its
turn follows from specific features of the way human categories are
organized.
The signature property of human information processing is a well-de-
veloped capacity to sort objects into categories on the basis of some
perceived or imagined similarity. Such similarity-based categories are
useful in part because they reduce the amount of information to which
people need to attend. Many types of categories are additionally useful in
that they extend our knowledge of the world. Categories, in virtue of
capturing nonobvious similarities between their members, allow us to go
considerably beyond the information that immediate experience pro-
vides. Natural categories (i.e., categories of naturally occurring things in
the world) are particularly potent in this regard, having great capacity to
underwrite a range of inferences that our immediate experience otherwise
does not support. Consider, for example, the natural category COLLIE
(ignoring for the moment the possibility that collies are an artifact of
human intervention into canine breeding). We expect that all collies
physically resemble one another. We further expect that all collies will
resemble each other behaviorally (e.g., all collies tend to bark at moving
cars), temperamentally (e.g., all collies show an aversion to cats), and
cognitively (e.g., all collies can follow a trail of scent but no collie can
learn to speak French).
In these respects, social objects are much like natural kinds. Humans
readily form categories of humans on the basis of outward appearances.
Humans in turn use these classifications to make predictions about the
behavioral, temperamental, and cognitive properties of category mem-
bers. There are, however, differences. When, in using natural categories,
we move from physical correlates to other properties, we typically inter-
pret this move to be motivated by the world's structure. The argument
has the following logic: (1) Natural category members physically resemble
each other (indeed, it is this physical resemblance that provides the cues
for recognizing natural commonality); (2) the commonality, however,
stems from something deeper, something more essential, and this inner
commonality is what underwrites the fact that these categories also
predict the distribution of a range of other properties (what is sometimes
called the inductive potential of natural kinds). In contrast, with social
categories the move from physical correlates to other properties—the
move from categorization to inferences about the distribution of other
66 • ETHOS
properties (what is usually called stereotyping in the case of social
categories)—is generally not explained as a consequence of the world's
structure but rather is attributed to the sorts of information-processing
factors that underlie categorization itself.
To illustrate this point, consider illusory correlations and in-group
favoritism, two processes that have been proposed as explanations for the
inductive potential of social categories. An illusory correlation is an
erroneous inference about the relationship between two classes of events.
Specifically, an illusory correlation is the overestimation of the frequency
with which distinctive events co-occur. Take as an example the claim that
race is the cause of the higher rates of crime encountered in many urban
settings in the sense that blacks commit more crimes than whites.
Hamilton and Gifford (1976) describe a process by which such a notion
gains currency. According to their illusory correlation model,
1. Infrequent events demand more attention than frequent events;
2. The conjunction of two infrequent events is even more notewor-
thy than one infrequent event;
3. When two co-occurring events share a distinctive feature (such as
being rare), people tend to perceive a correlation between them.
Illusory correlations underlie stereotypes to the extent that negative
events are rarer than neutral or positive events, and minority individuals
are rarer than majority individuals. Accordingly, people tend to attribute
negative events or descriptions more frequently to minority group mem-
bers than to majority group members.
In-group favoritism is another cognitive source of racial bias. Al-
though racial bias is often traceable to dynamics of power and authority,
Tajfel (1981) and his colleagues have shown that in-group favoritism does
not depend either on perceptions of potential group conflict or on a
consolidated notion of group. Tajfel found that simply telling someone
that they have been assigned to a certain group is sufficient to trigger
favoritism for other members of that group. Indeed, this is the case even
when subjects are aware that the basis of group assignment is arbitrary
(e.g., based on the last digit of their social security number), or when they
are aware that their "group" has no existence outside of the experimental
context.
It is important to realize that neither illusory correlation nor in-group
favoritism is specifically about race. The content of events and the specific
nature of the minority status have no consequence for the model. What
counts in illusory correlation is the relative frequency with which a
particular type of event is encountered and the prevalence of a particular
status in the social environment. Many events are rare and many social
statuses are rare. It matters little whether the individual is a minority in
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virtue of his or her race or in virtue of his or her political party affiliation,
sexual orientation, or preference for music. What is important is the
impulse to form categories and to calibrate their occurrence with other
salient (and attention-demanding) dimensions of the world. The bottom
line here is that psychologists have not theorized race, they have theo-
rized operations (e.g., stereotypy, in-group bias, and so forth) that act on
racial and other categories. As a consequence it is more accurate to say
that psychologists have elaborated theories about categories of objects
that include (but are not restricted to) race.
In contrast to a concern with the mental correlates of race, compa-
rativist social theorists have been interested largely in analyzing of the
public representations and practices of race. On this view, race is not the
inadvertent by-product of the way information is processed; it is the
contrived recruitment of a post-Enlightenment impulse to systematize
knowledge of natural phenomena in the service of the imperial enterprise.
The European states needed to regulate and hence enumerate subjugated
colonial populations, and race provided the ideological framework in
which to accomplish this. As such, the idea of race is not a discovery about
the structure of nature but an invention inscribed onto it.
The argument typically takes the following form:
1. Race is about relations of power;
2. Power is about aggregate structural (e.g., political, economic, or
cultural) relations, not mental ones;
3. Structural relations are mental only incidentally, only to the
extent that domination and subordination as lived practices mini-
mally have to be both represented and representable, typically in
some hegemonic guise;
4. Hence, a society's race concept is shaped by actually existing race
relations, not vice versa.
This emphasis on systems of cultural and political domination does
not mean that comparativists have failed to recognize that racial relations
of power are lived by individuals in the context of everyday practice. Nor
do these scholars deny that power relations have psychological correlates.
Several influential works point out the crucial importance that psycho-
logical interiorization plays in imperial racism (Fanon 1968; Mannoni
1964). But these studies differ from the psychological accounts reviewed
above in one crucial respect. Although it is acknowledged that historically
specific systems of racial thinking may be associated with specific mental




It stretches credibility to imagine that an idea with the political and
cultural potency of race could have purely cognitive origins. As a result,
it is hardly a shock that nonpsychologists generally find cognitive ac-
counts uncompelling. Similarly problematic for anthropologists and his-
torians studying race is the psychological claim that race demands and
focuses cognitive attention because it is impossible to ignore on percep-
tual grounds. Many systems of racial classification lack the supposedly
clear distinctions of the racial systems that psychologists usually study.
In fact, there is considerable reason to doubt that even North American
racial ideology is as directly rooted in physical appearances as folk
wisdom assumes (Dominguez 1986). This considerable historical and
cultural variation is testimony of the fact that systems of racial classifica-
tion are cultural and historical constructions, certainly not inferences
based on observed human biological variation.
Problems with the comparativist position may be less apparent to
many of this journal's readers. Because of this, I would like to elaborate
them in somewhat greater depth. Two are particularly important and both
turn on psychological issues. The first involves patterns of change in
systems of domination and their supporting ideologies. The second turns
on the role that race plays in causal explanation.
Patterns of Political and Ideological Change
On the comparative view, a society's ideas of race largely reflect the way
that society uses race in the regulation of power and authority. Given this,
we would anticipate that changes in the use made of race would result in
changes in the idea itself. Rephrased, if race is a category of mind because
it is a category of power (and has a particular form as an idea because of
the particular role it plays in the distribution of power), we would expect
racial thinking to change significantly with shifts in the underlying
material basis and cultural context on which it rests. Curiously this does
not always, or even frequently, happen.
Barbara Fields (1982) provides a nice example. She argues convinc-
ingly that American racial ideology is rooted in the historically specific
conditions of slavery in the British North American colonies. In particular,
she suggests that the idea of race (especially the idea that races are
fundamentally and intrinsically different) served to reconcile a liberal
political ideology of universal equality with the enslavement of blacks.
Nonetheless, she found that racial ideology changed little following abo-
lition, despite the fact that abolishment of slavery represented a funda-
mental, although far from complete, change in the way power and
authority were distributed and enacted in North America. In the end
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Fields is not surprised by this lack of correspondence between idea
(ideology) and use (slavery versus other modes of domination). She notes
that political belief systems generally tend to reproduce themselves,
rather than simply fading away when their supporting material conditions
change: Rather than disappearing, "far the more common situation in the
history of ideologies is that instead of dying, the same vocabulary attaches
itself, unnoticed, to new things. It is not that ideas have a life of their own,
but rather that they have a boundless facility for usurping the lives of men
and women" (1982:153). I propose that this boundless facility, at least
with respect to racial ideologies, emerges out of the peculiar properties of
race as an idea.
Race and Causal Explanations
Another problematic issue in the comparative perspective is the causal
force with which race is often attributed. Indeed, race and claims about
racial difference figure prominently in a range of causal accounts.
Whether offered by lay folk, scientists, or representatives of the govern-
ment, answers to questions about who is impoverished, in poor health,
politically disenfranchised, or poorly motivated in school invariably men-
tion race. Unquestionably this causal potency is among the most convinc-
ing evidence that race is a category of power. However, it is important to
keep in mind that the causal relationship is predominantly of the mind
(or ideology), not the world itself. Race differences (differences in people
contingent on their racial membership as opposed to differences attrib-
uted to people contingent on their supposed racial status) are seldom, if
ever, the cause of impoverishment, ill health, lack of political power, and
poor academic achievement. Other aspects of social existence (e.g., labor
and class position within a social hierarchy, economic status, and cultural
affiliation) are more often the basis for institutional disadvantage and
more often appropriately specify the dimension along which it lies.1 Race
does not explain inequities in the distribution of power and authority, it
explains them away by "distorting" our perception of material relations
(Winant 1994). Racial thinking serves both to legitimize and to misrep-
resent the way power is wielded and opportunity apportioned.
If changes in racial thinking are not directly tethered to changes in
the political context, and if racial thinking distorts rather than reflects
the material basis to which it is linked, then does it make sense to explain
race (or the idea of it) by reference to political and material relations?
Yes and no. Yes, to the extent that race and the political and material
environments in which it is found are strongly associated. No, to the
extent that this association is unmediated. When comparativists argue (or
more often assume) that a society's ideas of race largely reflect the way
race is used in the regulation of power and authority, they generally talk
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about this relationship as if it were unmediated (or uninterestingly
mediated) (see Hirschfeld 1996 for a review).
Indeed, this is not all that remarkable in view of the empiricist
epistemology that permeates most social science. On this view, very little
is thought to mediate between an idea and the conditions of existence it
represents. However, there is now growing skepticism about this claim,
and it is increasingly apparent that our cognitive endowment crucially
mediates between experience and representations of it (for reviews, see
Hirschfeld etal. 1982; Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994). Few continue to view
learning as the passive internalization of an external environment, be it
material or ideological. Instead, what was traditionally seen as learning is
now understood to be the outcome of the interaction of a variety of
endogenous programs for acquiring knowledge with a complex environ-
ment.
In the case of race this sort of cognitive mediation seems especially
likely. Recall that a number of comparativist scholars argue that racial
beliefs distort the material reality that these beliefs supposedly describe.
Distortion is a mental predicate. An idea distorts a reality to the extent
that there is some psychological mediation between the experience of a
reality and its representation. For racial categories the mediation is
exceptionally obvious. According to most racialist systems of belief,
humans are not only partitionable into racial groups, these groups are
thought to be natural. Race distorts the material reality (of human
biological variation) by drawing attention away from it and toward an-
other, conceptually more natural, dimension. The naturalization of race
is a major factor underlying the political potency of race to organize power
and authority. Indeed, authority is the naturalization of power, the
rendering of a particular power situation as "a fact in the nature of the
world" (Bloch 1974:79). Few ideas are more effective in this regard than
race. As Stuart Hall (1980:342) observes, race "discovers what other
ideologies have to construct: an apparently 'natural' and universal basis
in nature itself."
The question of interest is where does a naturalized notion of race
come from? For many historians and anthropologists the phenomenon
has social origins: the naturalization of race is part of the modern
elaboration of social ideology, originally rooted in post-18th-century
beliefs about cultural variation converging with a particular (and legiti-
mizing) theory of biology (Appiah 1990; Goldberg 1993; Guillaumin 1980;
Takaki 1992). According to this theory, race is naturalized to the extent
that it is biologized or mapped onto a modern theory of biology. The
"natural" notion of race is "the belief that groups are naturally diverse,
because of endogenous characteristics which are determining factors in
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themselves, independently of history or economics" (Guillaumin
1980:45).
RACE VERSUS NOT RACE
Scholars in the comparative tradition do not deny that prior to the
European imperial enterprise people conceived of themselves and others
as belonging to specific groups whose members shared a range of common
and fundamental properties. Racial ideology supposedly stands apart from
these antecedent forms because of the special power relationship with
which the modern idea is invested and the special kind of (biological)
commonality that supposedly is shared among members of the same race.
Race is a historically unique phenomenon, rising out of a singular conflu-
ence of cultural, political, scientific, and economic events and practices
that defined a particular set of political relations. To the extent that this
is the case, it should be possible to discern whether a system of classifi-
cation is racial by assessing the degree to which it is structured around
the relevant (folk) biological beliefs, specifically expectations about the
embodiment, naturalness, perseverance, and invisible causal force of
race. In fact, a number of scholars have employed just such a strategy as
a racial acid test.
Takaki (1992), for instance, identifies the moment that racial think-
ing emerged in British North America during the 17th century. He argues
that this occurred when colonists shifted their interpretation of Indian
"savagery" from a matter of culture (defined as a redeemable state of
savagery) to a matter of nature (defined as an irredeemable state of
savagery). The shift he describes is subtle, in significant measure because,
as Takaki makes clear, the British had long used a racial-like (but
not-yet-racial) discourse to characterize the other colonized populations.
Indeed, he notes that the language of political discourse about the Irish,
which considerably predates that about the indigenous population of
North America, was virtually indistinguishable from that used to describe
the latter. Still, Takaki argues there is a fundamental difference in the two
discourses. "Although [the English] saw the Irish as savages and although
they sometimes described this savagery as 'natural' and 'innate,' the
English believed that the Irish could be civilized, improved through . . .
'nurture.' In short, the difference between the Irish and the English was
a matter of culture" (1992:895). In contrast, the difference between
Native Americans and the English was natural. Native Americans, in the
British view, were quite literally dehumanized, demonized, and natural-
ized: "Indian identity became then a matter of 'descent.' Their racial
markers indicated ineradicable qualities of savagery" (1992:907).
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It is not clear, however, that the distinction between nature and
nurture, redeemable and irredeemable, on which Takaki sets so much
significance is really all that critical historically. We know that in current
thought much weight is placed on racial-versus-cultural (or ethnic) dif-
ference, and a number of scholars have proposed that the two phenomena
are distinct (Smedley 1993; Sollors 1986). Despite this, there is consid-
erable evidence to suggest that a principled (and not historically contin-
gent) way of drawing the distinction is difficult to identify. For example,
many contemporary ethnic groups (groups whose commonality is now
thought to turn on matters of culture) were until recently considered
racial groups (groups whose commonality is thought of as a matter of
heredity). Southern Europeans, Jews, and indeed the Irish in America
were considered nonwhites during the first decades of the 20th century
(Alba 1985; Roediger 1994). It may well be, as Takaki argues, that there
were subtle differences in the way English colonizers mentally repre-
sented and imaged the Irish and the Indians, and it may be that this
involved differences in the scope of redeemability attributed to each. But
this does not imply that one group was racialized and the other not. It
may imply that under current interpretation, one group would be racial-
ized and the other not. But it does not follow that current habits of
interpretation are informative of 17th-, 18th-, or 19th-century systems of
belief.
A similar argument can be made about the identification of race with
a specific sort of naturalization, namely biology. Guillaumin (1980) argues
that it was only after the elaboration, in the 19th century, of a biological
theory for explaining the heredity of somatic traits that an essentialist
vision of race became possible (1980:54; see also Appiah 1990; Smedley
1993). In this view, race is a fairly modern and historically specific notion.
Undoubtedly a major and extensive elaboration of racialist theory oc-
curred during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Just as clearly, during
this same period theories of biology came to occupy pride of place in
public discourse on race. This certainly makes it appear that racial
thinking is fundamentally linked with the rise of biological science (and
biological scientism, the lay interpretation, and implementation of bio-
logical theory). However, we should take care to keep the horse before
the cart. The relationship between modern biology and race is important
because it is a mapping of a theory of the natural world onto a theory of
human variation. In this regard, the relationship between biology and race
is one between ethnotheory about natural causality and a claim about
human diversity. The important point to bear in mind is that all systems
of racial belief make reference to natural causality (Hirschfeld 1996).
There is no reason to assume that modern biological causality is the only
natural causality we encounter in racial discourse.
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Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the basic building block
of naturalization, essentialist reasoning, may not be directly related to
biological thought at all. As Douglas Medin (1989) has pointed out,
essentialist reasoning may well be an integral part of our cognitive
expectations of the world generally. Unlike philosophers who have sought
to link essentialist reasoning to essences in the world (e.g., Putnam 1975),
Medin proposes that people have a distinct way of thinking about essen-
tialism that is largely independent of the way that mental essences
(psychological essences) might be linked to real essences (metaphysical
essences). He argues that "people act as if things (e.g., objects) have
essences or underlying natures that make them the thing that they are. . . .
It is important to note that psychological essentialism refers not to how
the world is but rather to how people approach the world" (Medin
1989:1476-1467).
If psychological essentialism is, as Medin argues, "bad metaphysics"
and owes little to encounters with the real (metaphysical) essences, where
does psychological essentialism come from? He makes the following, and
compelling, proposal: "why should people act as if things had essences?
The reason is that it may prove to be good epistemology. One could say
that people adopt an essentialist heuristic, namely, the hypothesis that
things that look alike tend to share deeper properties (similarities). Our
perceptual and conceptual systems appear to have evolved such that the
essentialist heuristic is very often correct" (Medin 1989:1476).
Intriguingly, several scholars, notably Gordon Allport (1954), have
offered much the same explanation for racial essences. According to
Allport, racial essentialism is also grounded in cognitive instrumentality,
specifically what he calls the principle of least effort. Racial thinking is
useful because it saves processing time: "To consider every member of a
group as endowed with the same traits saves us the pains of dealing with
them as individuals" (1954:173). In this regard, bothMedin's and Allport's
views contrast with the comparativist position that situates essentialist
reasoning in specific historical and cultural configurations (e.g., Fuss
1989). In their views essentialism is a property of the mind, not a property
of a particular system of power or its ideological legitimization.2
I would like to go further and propose that racial essentialism is not
only a property of the mind; it is a domain-specific property of the mind.
The essentialization of racial kinds is not the by-product of a general
impetus for cognitive economy, that is, an effect that emerges in the
context of all systems of categorization. Rather, it represents a very
specific turn of mind. It is precisely because race is essentialized that it
serves systems of power and authority so well. Accordingly, it may make
more sense to say that race is a category of power because it is a category
of mind than to argue that it is a category of mind because it is a category
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of power. But this makes sense only when we qualify "category of mind"
by saying "a very specific category of mind."
TWO CAVEATS
Before going further, it is important to underscore what I am not suggest-
ing. Two points are critical: first, I am not claiming that race is a natural
category of the mind; and second, I am not claiming that racial thinking
is impervious to the cultural or political environment in which it is found.
Let me address each of these in turn.
Race Is Not a Natural Category of the Mind
What I suggest is that the abstract principles that give rise to racial
thinking probably are natural to the mind. Humans know a tremendous
amount about other humans—arguably they know more about other
humans than anything else. It is not surprising, then, that humans know
quite a bit about the scope and nature of the groups or collectivities into
which humans coalesce. After all, a hallmark feature of humans is their
proclivity for living in groups and forming coalitions. Life in the complex
and multilayered social environments that humans inhabit is possible
only to the extent that humans have sufficient capacities to mentally
represent and identify with these groups and coalitions.
The argument that humans have a special-purpose mental faculty for
reasoning about humans in groups is not all that surprising given what we
now know about the faculties that humans have for reasoning about other
domains of the world. A rich multidisciplinary literature supports the
notion that the human mind is composed of independent modules,
faculties, or domain-specific competencies (the appropriate descriptive
term depends on the theorist one consults), each of which is specialized
in processing a particular range of information and guides hypothesis
formation and reasoning about a more or less well-bounded phenomenon.
Considerable work, for instance, explores the child's theory of mind and
traces it to an evolved module for thinking about behavior as motivated
by states of mind (i.e., beliefs and desires). Similarly, much work provides
evidence for a naive mechanics and traces it to an evolved module for
thinking about the physical world in more or less Euclidean terms (for
detailed discussion, see the introduction and other relevant chapters in
Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994). It is thus plausible to imagine that the
development of a representational system for thinking about human
coalitions is facilitated by an endogenous curiosity deeply rooted in our
cognitive endowment.
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Indeed, humans have a spontaneous curiosity and a rich repre-
sentational system for thinking about human groupings of a particular
sort—collectivities based on intrinsic commonalities between group
members. Elsewhere I have argued that this curiosity and repre-
sentational system flow from a module (Mirschfeld 1996), perhaps even
an evolved mechanism for developing knowledge of human kinds. What
would this module look like? First and foremost it would consist of a
willingness to make certain ontological commitments, in particular the
commitment that the human world is composed of distinct types or kinds.
A range of human kinds is possible. There are kinds based on common
behavioral features, kinds predicated on common physical features, kinds
predicated on common emotional characteristics, and so on. Like other
domain-specific devices, the human kind competence is comprehensive.
People not only create human kinds (in the sense of sorting individuals
into relevant kinds) but also assume that in virtue of category membership
individuals who might otherwise be dissimilar are fundamentally alike in
their nonobvious and basic natures. As we will see, this is a crucial point.
The human kind-creating competence delivers categories that do not
embody difference, they interpret it. Race is one of the most recurrent
ways of thinking about intrinsic commonalities and human kinds.
Whether it is a universal way of categorizing the world is not of great
import. Clearly, it is a common way to partition the social world and an
easy one to learn. My argument is that this is so in part because racial
thinking emerges out of the operation of a more general human kind mode
of reasoning about human difference. What is natural is not a racial turn
of mind but a human kind one. The race concept emerges out the
operation of the human kind module as it makes contact with certain
environmental conditions.
Because innate modules have been linked to evolved mechanisms, it
is worth taking a slight detour to ask how evolution may have shaped a
human kind module and how my claims about it differ from other claims
about the evolution of human sociality. At least three different evolution-
ary issues are related to the question of a human kind module: (1) the
evolutionary advantage of group living (e.g., the cost and benefits of
sociality); (2) how evolution shaped behavioral and mental responses that
might facilitate group living (e.g., the development of detectors for recog-
nizing members of one's own group or the development of patterned
behaviors toward and attitudes about in-group members versus strang-
ers); and (3) conceptual structures that might guide the formation of
hypotheses about the scope and nature of human group living (e.g., the
development of an ontological commitment to groups as atoms of social
experience).
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With reference to the first evolutionary issue, quite a bit of specula-
tion focuses on why humans live in groups and what mental correlates
there may be to group living. Theorists from very different perspectives
ground sociality (i.e., the cognitive basis for group living) in processes of
reciprocity (Alexander 1979, 1987, 1989; LeVi-Strauss 1969). A number
of evolutionary explanations have been offered, mostly involving the
positive consequences that reciprocal social systems have for resource
management and exploitation (Wrangham 1980) and the protection that
group living provides against predation. The latter includes predation
both from within the group (as when females bond to defend against
coercion by males within the group [Brereton 1996]) and those from
outside the group (as when group members live in groups to protect
themselves against predation by conspecifics (Shaw and Wong 1989;
Warnecke et al. 1992).
With respect to the second issue, most interest in the evolution of
the mental correlates to group living centers on one of two phenomena:
(1) the ways by which humans identify individuals who are members of
their own group (Shaw and Wong 1989; van den Berghe 1981), or (2) the
way in which identification of members of one's own and other groups
(i.e., judgments of in-group versus out-group) are tied to attitudes and
behaviors that promote group cohesion, typically through the develop-
ment of in-group favoritism and out-group enmity (Fishbein 1996;
Reynolds 1987; van den Berghe 1981). As a result, when evolutionary
theorists discuss race they tend to focus on racism, particularly on how
adaptations that foster in-group favoritism and out-group enmity might
underlie later-developing ideologies like racism, ethnocentrism, or na-
tionalism.3
With respect to the third issue, evolutionary studies have tradition-
ally sought to identify mechanisms and principles that produce behaviors
(like in-group favoritism and out-group enmity) that make greater or
lesser contributions to genetic fitness. Less attention has been given to
mechanisms and principles that produce cognitive goals that under
differing conditions give rise to a range of behaviors and beliefs that
contribute to genetic fitness (Dunbar 1988). The evolved mechanism I
propose is more closely linked to goals than specific behaviors. To better
convey what I mean by goals versus behaviors, consider the following two
plausible adaptations: the first involves a flight reaction to disturbances
on the ground that might be made by a snake; the second involves a
preparedness to interpret behavior as resulting from an individual's
beliefs and desires. The first could well be fixed in the mind as a simple
behavioral sequence; the perception of certain movement in the grass
causes flight. It works without conceptual mediation in the sense that it
occurs without ever having to call up a mental image of a snake, associ-
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ating that image with danger and inferring "time to run." The second sort
of adaptation, in contrast, requires conceptual mediation, in particular a
willingness to attribute mental states like belief and desire, and a com-
mitment to interpret behavior as being directly linked to such states. The
second sort of adaptation, then, involves a goal: given certain stimulus
conditions (i.e., human behavior), try to find an interpretation that
includes beliefs and desires. The first sort of adaptation does not involve
a goal: given certain stimulus conditions (i.e., movement in the grass),
flee.
The human kind module is an adaptation of the second sort because
it does not directly deliver specific beliefs about the dimensions on which
groups might form or how individuals might value each other. Rather it
guides how humans come to represent the world's social structure. Many
nonhuman social animals appear to have specific beliefs about intergroup
relations in that they appear to display in-group favoritism and out-group
enmity (Fishbein 1996). Moreover, some nonhuman primates appear to
display rudimentary group predicates in that they infer "general proper-
ties of social relationships and compare relationship on the basis of these
properties" (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990:61). Still, both of these phenom-
ena are in principle independent of a capacity to form goals like those that
I suggest a human kind module provides, namely a willingness to repre-
sent the world in terms of corporate social entities. In short, the mere
identification of an individual as belonging to a privileged group (or
identifying another individual as not belonging to that group) is not the
same as understanding social existence in terms of group entities.
Consider an analogous phenomenon. Neonates can reliably distin-
guish their mother's native language from other languages, even when the
speaker is not their mother and even when they are presented with highly
degraded samples of speech (Mehler et al. 1988). We could not conclude
from this that neonates have a (meta)conception of language or that they
have a conception of languages. Rather they appear to be equipped with
detectors that permit them to distinguish some class of speech from
others. But this capacity underdetermines the child's eventual ontological
commitment to the idea that there are multiple languages in the world
(Hirschfeld 1996). Children or other species may reason in accord with
adults in many respects. But this does not mean that they share theories.
The same thought can be consistent with more than one theory.
Finally, speculation that there is a direct link between recognizing
social difference and predicating action on it may overestimate how useful
such a link may be. For instance, thought experiments by evolutionary
theorists aside, the image of intense intergroup competition during the
Pleistocene in which xenophobic hostility was pandemic is not as well
supported by the anthropological evidence as is often supposed. Many of
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the hunter/gatherer groups that theorists rely on to gain insight into our
ancestral populations' social life are in fact refugee populations who have
been pushed fairly recently into marginal environments. There is little
reason to believe that our ancestral populations lived in environments as
hostile as that, say, of contemporary Bushmen, and thus there is little
reason to believe that the environment of our ancestral population se-
lected for adaptations necessary to survive under such conditions. Simi-
larly, basing our models of ancestral social experience on the Yanomomi,
particularly the violence of their society, distorts what aboriginal life
before contact may have been like. For instance, first-contact reports
document both a freedom of movement across group boundaries and a
lack of sharp frontiers between groups. Indeed, Fried (1975) convincingly
argues that corporate notions like the tribe are inadequate descriptions
of aboriginal groupings.
No other social creature lives in groups as fluid and complex as
humans. Human societies, even the least elaborated ones, require that
each actor has multiple social identities and multiple group affiliations,
be they gender- or age- or kin-based. If human cognitions about groups
were simply a direct and genetically determined response to encounters
with markers of group difference, we would have chaos, not ethnocen-
trism. Humans and other primates represent and attend to relationships
between individuals, not just to badges of similitude and difference
(Alexander 1987; Dunbar 1988). From an evolutionary perspective this
means that we need to explain how humans come to conceptualize
multiple and orthogonal dimensions of social affiliation, how they come
to apply the valuative calculi of racism, ethnocentrism, or nationalism,
and how they come to predicate action on such evaluations. If, however,
humans were prepared to develop a commitment to an ontological level
of corporate group existence, these tasks would be facilitated. It is this
capacity for thinking about the human world as comprised of corporate
groups as well as individual actors that I seek to capture when describing
a human kind module as evolved mechanism.
Racial Thinking Is Underdetermined by the Human Kind Module and Is
Thus Not Impervious to the Cultural and Political Environments in
Which It Occurs
The readiness to categorize humans into human kinds would neces-
sarily underdetermine any particular system of social referencing. Social
belief does not spring from a human kind module, it is enabled and guided
by it. In order to produce a system of social belief, the human kind module
must make contact with a cultural environment. The analytic trick is to
understand how, when, and in what way cultural, political, and other
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ideological systems recruit innately guided strategies for acquiring knowl-
edge of human kinds.
Systems of racial thinking vary considerably across cultures and
historic time. My proposal neither denies this variability nor implies that
it is trivial. Nor am I suggesting that racial thinking is impervious to the
cultural and political environments. Indeed, racial thinking is literally
unthinkable in the absence of such environments. Something, and typi-
cally it is a system of cultural belief, channels an abstract set of expecta-
tions about human difference onto a specific range of differences and a
specific way to viewing them. In some, in fact in many, social formations
this turns out to be racial. But the range of ways of interpreting raciality
vary considerably, and therefore the way these abstract principles derive
substance varies accordingly. Some systems, like the contemporary North
American one, focus on visible and dramatic differences in appearance.
Other systems, like the midcentury German one, draw more attention to
public sociology than to accessible morphology.
CHILDREN AND RACIAL THINKING
Earlier I presented the following argument: If racial categories take form
in virtue of the political purposes they serve and the cultural environment
in which they emerge, then we would expect that features of racial
thinking that are historically specific and politically contingent will be
found only in the corresponding historical and political environments. It
has been widely accepted in the comparativist literature that racial
thinking is naturalized and essentialized in virtue of being structured
around modern beliefs about the embodiment, naturalness, perseverance,
and invisible causal force of biological traits. These principles of reasoning
about biological phenomena have been transferred to the social realm as
part of the imperial colonial enterprise's naturalization of human groups.
One way to assess whether this is the case is to appraise how closely
tied this version of racial traits is to this particular confluence of political
and cultural factors. Is race naturalized only in the context of 19th- (or
18th- or 17th-) century European political economy? Is race essentialized
only when tied to the modern notion of biological essence? If race is
naturalized in cultural formations in which essentialization plays little
role in the regulation of power and authority, then we have persuasive
evidence that neither naturalization nor essentialization are politically
derived or politically contingent. In short, if racial thinking is essential-
ized even in systems of thought in which race is unpoliticized, this would
suggest that its potency as an idea may derive more from its mental
properties than from the place it occupies in a system of political ideology.
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A major problem with actually pursuing this comparative research
strategy is that it is no longer possible, indeed it may never have been
possible, to find a cultural formation in which race is not politicized, even
if only by leakage from more dominant systems of belief and power.
Political ideologies are by definition embedded in systems of hegemony;
and systems of hegemonic relations bleed at the seams. By intent or not,
systems of political belief that serve to sustain systems of unequal power
tend to influence belief systems that at first blush seem outside their
purview. Still, the problem is not insurmountable. There is one compara-
tive strategy that is available and informative. Our children's racial beliefs
and political ideologies are not exactly ours. It is possible to examine the
development of our children's racial beliefs and explore the relationship
between these beliefs and the role race plays in regulation of juvenile
power. On the face of it, this seems a curious empirical strategy. For one
thing, it is not exactly a cultural comparison. While our children's and
our thinking may not always match, they are nonetheless closely linked.
In fact, a number of influential approaches to maturation cast the child
as little more than an incomplete, often inept, imitator of adult practice
and belief. Is it fair, then, to interpret child/adult differences as a cultural
contrast?
As counterintuitive as it may seem, I believe that there is ample
evidence for saying yes. A body of work is now emerging on children's and
youth cultures that suggests that we must view childhood not simply as a
period for acquiring and imitating adult cultural competence, but as a
time of (sub)culture construction. This in no way implies that children
neither acquire nor imitate adults and adult practices. It is, however, to
reject two tropes that have dominated modern Western views of children:
the innocent child and the developing child. Both take childhood to be a
period in which the child's principal task is to evolve toward a fixed adult
endpoint. Most importantly, both take childhood to be a period of sus-
tained and marked incompetence. In this view, children speak, act, and
think as they do because they are incapable of doing much else. Their
speech, actions, and thoughts are pale imitations of the adult counter-
parts.
In view of how deeply these beliefs are entrenched in modern
Euro-American culture, it is remarkable how historically recent this
image of the child is and how few other cultures have embraced it (Aries
1962).4 In many parts of the world and in many historical epochs, it would
be and would have been curious to claim, as we generally do, that children
are cognitively incomplete and socially inept creatures. Rather, children
are seen as strikingly competent beings whose lives are embedded in, but
not solely shaped, by the lives of the adults with whom they share a life
space. Finally, many now acknowledge that children live in cultures
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significantly of their own making, cultures that are interestingly distinct
from and often in counterpoint to the adult cultures surrounding them.
Children's culture is as much a distinct construction as it is a version of
adult culture. Increasingly, ethnographically oriented scholars in the
modern Euro-American tradition are recognizing this (Amit-Talai and
Wulff 1995; Corsaro and Eder 1990; Hirschfeld 1996).
Several lines of evidence converge to indicate that preschool culture
in the United States is racially unlike that of adults, despite how deeply
saturated American life is with a particular racial ideology. Part of the
distinctiveness of preschool children's racial culture flows from the fact
that young children's racial experience (i.e., experience with racial dif-
ference) is often quite unlike that of adults. For instance, because of the
hypersegregation of American life (Massey 1993), young children, of all
backgrounds, often have few opportunities for extended contact with
peoples of other races. Moreover, many minority families structure young
children's experience in ways that buffer the impact and consequences
of the dominant racial politics (Jackson et al. 1988). Perhaps most
striking, American parents studiously avoid talking about race with their
young children (Kofkin et al. 1995). Finally, a number of naturalistic and
experimental studies have found that race plays little role in organizing
young children's behavior and occupies little space in children's speech
(Aboud 1988; Hirschfeld 1988; Holmes 1995).
All this suggests that race is less salient to young children than we
might otherwise imagine, given how salient it is in American society.
Germane to this discussion, race also appears to lack the political signifi-
cance for young American children that it has for adults. What I mean by
"lack of political significance" is the observation that race plays little role
in shaping children's choice of association and little role in determining
how resources under children's control are distributed. As an example,
young children's choice of playmates is little affected by race. It is not
simply that young children are innocent of or inattentive to human group
differences when choosing playmates. Age, gender, and even native
language (for bilingual children) are important factors in children's will-
ingness to befriend other children (Doyle 1983). But not race. Perhaps
the strongest evidence that race lacks the same political valence for young
children as it does for adults is the lack of racial difference in children's
racial practices and beliefs. Unlike adults, whose beliefs about race vary
considerably depending on the race of the individual involved, for chil-
dren we find little effect for race of child.
In brief, children's social praxis is much as their parents would like
it to be—color blind. However, this pattern of nonracialized behavior and
speech is not, contrary to conventional wisdom, because young children
are literally color blind. Young children recognize and attend to differ-
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ences in physical appearances, including race. They, like adults around
them, have named racial categories. They can use these racial categories
to make sense of social experience if not to organize social behavior
(Hirschfeld 1993, 1995.)
The favored explanation for the relative absence of a juvenile racial
politic is that race has a fundamentally different meaning for young
children than it does for the adults around them (Aboud 1988; Holmes
1995; Katz 1982). According to this view, young children conceive of race
as a superficial quality of people, one that is literally skin-deep. Adults, in
contrast, invariably see race as capturing much more than difference in
outward physical features. For adults, race is not simply a catalogue of
human difference, it is an account of the nature of that difference. In brief,
adults see the visible qualities of race as signals for more important
invisible qualities. Thus, for adults, on this view, race is about physical
appearance, but it is also about racial essence; for children, race is only
about physical appearance, never about essence.
If this were the case, it would lend support to the claim that the
naturalization of racial thinking coemerges with the politicization of race.
Adults politicize race, children do not; adults essentialize race, children
do not. This conclusion turns on children's racial thinking being as
superficial and unessentialized as previous work suggests. The principal
support for the claim that children interpret racial and other social
properties superficially comes from studies purporting to show that young
children overestimate (compared with adults) the importance that ap-
pearances play in determining identity. For example, when asked what
happens if a person's hair and clothing are changed in gender-relevant
ways (e.g., by dressing a boy in girl's clothes), children up to seven years
of age typically say that the person has changed sex (Carey 1985;
Emmerich et al. 1977; Gelman et al. 1986; Kohlberg 1966; Slaby and Frey
1975). Parallel studies have shown that children make similar judgments
about a person whose racial or ethnic appearance undergoes a similar
rapid change. For example, when preschoolers are asked if a non-Eskimo
dressed up like an Eskimo is an Eskimo, they tend to answer yes (Aboud
1988; Ramsey 1987). Similarly, when Semaj (1980) asked young black
children if they were still black when they put on white makeup and a
blond wig, they typically responded no. These findings have been inter-
preted as evidence that before age nine children fail to conserve racial
identity across perceptual transformations.
The question of essence arises because young children's apparent
failure to understand both gender and racial constancy is interpreted as
evidence that children do not understand that identity is tied to a small
set of deep biological properties. The development and elaboration of
these biological properties is tied commonsensically to the transfer of
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invisible but material essences from parent to offspring. Thus, in the case
of race, young children's failure at racial-constancy tasks is understood
to indicate that young children are unaware of the biological origins of
racial features (i.e., their constancy over the life span), and that a person's
racial features are a function of the racial features of his or her parents
(Aboud 1988). The importance of these findings is evident if we contrast
them with the supposed adult pattern of response to the same question
(I say "supposed" because there has been relatively little corresponding
research among adults). For adults, change in sex would only occur if
essential properties were altered. Changes in accidental properties, like
clothing or hair length, do not produce identity shifts. Moreover, for
adults, changes in essential properties are difficult to imagine and thought
to be difficult to achieve (consider the debate about sex-change opera-
tions). In contrast, changes in accidental properties are relatively easy to
imagine and enact.
How convincing are the findings that children do not share this
essentialist view of race or that they are incapable of distinguishing racial
properties from other less "natural" properties? Gelman et al. (1994)
propose the following criteria for essentialist reasoning: (1) explicit ar-
ticulation of an essentialist philosophy, (2) an expectation of immutability
(or constancy) of identity over superficial transformation, (3) appeal to
invisible causal mechanisms, and (4) assumption of innate disposition.
Adults believe that all four of criteria apply to racial essences (see
Hirschfeld 1996 for a review). I have conducted a series of studies showing
that all but the explicit articulation criterion (children do not talk about
race, so we can hardly expect them to talk about racial essences) charac-
terize young children's reasoning about race (Hirschfeld 1988, 1993,
1995). In the briefest terms, these studies demonstrate that by three years
of age, children have a much more adult-like understanding of race, and
particularly racial essentialism, than previous scholars have credited
them with.5 Even quite young children expect racial identity to be linked
to family background, inherited, and impervious to environmental influ-
ence. Most important, these studies show that children's reasoning about
race is unlike their reasoning about other identity-relevant traits that
have similarly rich physical correlates. For example, even three-year-olds
believe that a child is more likely to racially resemble its parents than to
resemble them in physique. (Despite the fact that a person's physique is
linked to family background, is inherited, and is largely immutable over
the life span.) These findings strongly indicate that even quite young
children's expectations about racial constancy are more essentialized and
less perceptually bound than earlier studies suggest.
As an illustration, let me describe one of the studies that provides
particularly powerful support for this conclusion. Recall that according to
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earlier researchers, young children believe that racial identity is shaped
by conditions of social existence, not biology. To test this more directly,
we asked young children what happens when infants are switched at birth
and raised by adoptive parents whose race is different from that of the
birth parents. Specifically, we told a group of young children about two
families, one black the other white, who had babies on the same day at
the same hospital.6 Inadvertently, however, each couple took the other
couple's baby home with them. We stressed the importance of pregnancy
to birth (by remarking that the baby came out of the mother's tummy)
and highlighted the social correlates of parenting (by telling children
about the care, feeding, and affection that the adoptive parents gave the
child). We told the children that these infants grew up and eventually
started school. We then showed them pictures of two school-aged chil-
dren, one who racially resembled the birth parents, the other who racially
resembled the adoptive parents. Children were then asked to identify
which was the child at school age. We figured that if children believe that
race is a socially determined property, they would choose the baby that
matched the race of the adoptive parents. If they believe that race is a
biological or natural property impervious to social existence, they would
choose the baby that matches the race of the birth parents. The results
were quite clear. Most three-year-olds and virtually all four-year-olds
chose the child that matched the birth parents' race, clearly demonstrat-
ing that they believe that an individual's race is set in a person's nature,
not in the conditions of their nurture. Clearly, children naturalize race.
These findings, however, do not tell us whether children believe that
race is more naturalized than other properties, particularly nonracial
physical ones. That is, the findings do not tell us whether children are
generally nativists or whether they are nativists only about some kinds
of attributes. Earlier work aside, perhaps young children believe that all
kinds of properties are deep (or intrinsic). Alternatively, they might
believe that race and other inherited properties are deep, but still doubt
that material transfer has anything to do with their reproduction. The
issue is important because the question we are trying to resolve is the role
that the political environment plays in shaping the essentialist content of
racial beliefs. If all social categories are essentialized (or essentialized to
the same degree), then it does not make much sense to pose the question
as we have.
Ken Springer (1992, 1995) reports a series of studies that help
determine the extent to which racial cognitions are peculiar in this regard.
Using fundamentally the same switched-at-birth task, he found that
preschool children believe that children will physically resemble their
birth parents. Moreover, they attribute this resemblance to a material yet
nonobvious substance that passes from the mother to the fetus during
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pregnancy. Importantly, Springer showed that children do not essential-
ize all possible parent/child resemblances. His switched-at-birth study
asked children about a range of possible resemblances, including ones
involving physical properties (such as being tall versus short), nonphysi-
cal properties (such as beliefs), and preferences (such as likes dogs more
than cats). He found that children were nativists only about biologically
relevant physical properties (i.e., being tall versus short), not nonphysical
properties or preferences. These findings considerably narrow the field:
young children seem to be nativists about biologically based physical
properties.
But pace my initial claim, given that children are nativists about
several biological properties, Springer's data do not seem to support the
idea that race is more deeply essentialized than other properties. My claim
is that in virtue of the human kind-making module, racial concepts (i.e.,
race as a category of mind) have a singular structure, and that by
extension they play a special, singular role in reasoning. If young children
believe that all physical properties are equally natural, the value of these
data to the racial chicken-and-egg question is much diluted. The relevant
developmental question accordingly is whether race is more deeply and
more precociously essentialized than other physical properties. To see
whether this is the case, we asked another group of preschool children
about another set of couples and their switched-at-birth offspring. In this
second study the parents contrasted not only in their race but in their
physique. There were two conditions: half the children were told about a
black and hefty couple and a white and wiry couple; the other half were
told about a black and wiry couple and a white and hefty couple. The same
switched-at-birth story was used. In this case, however, children were
faced with the choice of offspring that matched parents in either race or
in physique (thus, for children in the first condition the choices were a
black, wiry child or a hefty, white one). The results were both informative
and unambiguous. Even quite young children overwhelmingly reasoned
that children would share racial but not physical properties with their
birth parents. Bear in mind that the contrast was not fat and thin but hefty
and wiry, aspects of physique that are as inherited and relevant to group
identity as skin color (Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza 1976; Cavalli-Sforza and
Gavalli-Sforza 1995).7
What accounts for this readiness of younger children to naturalize
race more than physique? Is it a function of children finding race to be
inherently more relevant to group identity than physique? I do not believe
that evidence supports this. By distinguishing children's culture, thought,
and experience from adults, I am not suggesting that children and adults
live in separate worlds. Clearly they share much of their life space. Recall
that earlier I argued that the human kind module underdetermines racial
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belief. The module guides the development of belief by channeling atten-
tion toward some hypotheses and away from others. It triggers a curiosity
about ontology but does not specify the specific elements of the ontology.
Part of the reason that children place more "natural" weight on race than
on physique is that in American society race is both named and highly
salient cultural categories while physique is not. Adults provide the
human kind categories, children provide the means of interpreting them.
In short, I do not believe that children naturally naturalize race; rather,
they naturally naturalize those social dimensions that the ambient cul-
tural tradition marks as salient. In this sense culture and cognition, as
Shweder (1990) has argued, make each other up.
CONCLUSION
Together these studies lend support to the claim that children, even quite
young children, essentialize and naturalize race. They also appear to do
so in large measure on their own. While children and adults share a
narrative about race, they share only part of that narrative. For children,
an essentialized construal of race emerges and is elaborated long before
it is understood that race is a factor in an ideological and political system
of power. It makes little sense, accordingly, to say that this juvenile
construal is a function of the political economic environment.
Indeed, these findings suggest another interpretation of the relation-
ship between race as a category of power and as a category of mind. Race,
as Hall (1980) remarked in the passage cited earlier, "naturally" natural-
izes. Race has in itself—in its psychological core—a naturalizing and
essentializing potency that makes it a particularly powerful political
trope. Instead of seeing this potency as derived from the political eco-
nomic environment, as comparativists have typically done, it makes more
sense to argue that the political environment recruits a particular way of
viewing and reasoning about human difference, because this particular
way of viewing the world has important consequences for how readily a
system of power and domination can be implemented. Race is a category
of power because it is a peculiar category of the mind.
Again, it is important here to stress what I am not proposing. In
arguing that young children are nativists about race I am not suggesting
that they have an innate notion of race. Instead, what I suggest is that
children spontaneously explore the social world around them in search
of intrinsic human kinds or groups of individuals that are thought to bear
some deep and enduring commonality. Different cultures inscribe the
social environment with different human kinds. While race is one of the
most recurring of these, it is not the only one. Gender, caste, age grade,
and class are all examples of intrinsic human kinds. Race itself—the idea
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of race—is not innate. Rather it is the product of this spontaneous
curiosity about human kinds as it engages a particular cultural formation.
Nor do I suggest that children discover race independent of the
cultural environment in which they live: not all cultural formations are
racialized, so not all children will spontaneously discover race. Children
in, say, North America discover race precisely because race is entrenched
in the North American cultural environment, and racial ideas, discourse,
and practice saturate it. Arguing this, however, is not the same as arguing
that children discover race simply because they encounter the political
economic relations of race. In view of their limited understanding of
political economy and the absence of race from the power relations they
do engage, it would be a difficult task for young children to do this (see
Hirschfeld 1996 for a more detailed discussion of this point). Young
children discover race because their spontaneous, endogenous curiosity
makes contact with the categories of their parents' minds. They do this
because race is easy to think—easier perhaps than other dimensions of
power, like class, that are often more fundamental to the distribution of
power and authority. In turn, systems of power continue to make contact
with and recruit race because it is easy to think. In so doing, our cognitive
architecture makes a political architecture possible.
The evidence I review here accords well with this claim but does not
rule out other possibilities. One way to strengthen the claim would be to
replicate the effect in other contexts. For example, in South Asia the most
relevant human kinds are arguably caste and, by extension, occupation.
If I am correct in my argument, South Asian children should essentialize
and naturalize caste and even occupation, but not (or to a much lesser
degree) race. Similarly there are many systems of racial belief in which
marked differences in appearance play little or no role. There is no reason
to believe that essentialization and naturalization are linked to actual
differences in appearance. How would children in these traditions per-
form on the tasks I have described here? What kinds of tasks would be
needed to assess belief in such contexts? Much work needs to be done,
and happily it is work that combines rather than opposes the insights of
anthropologists, historians, and psychologists.
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1. Equally important to point out is that race is not the biological cause of any of these
outcomes, despite the popularity that such claims enjoy. Race cannot be a biological cause
because race is not a biologically coherent notion. There is as much genetic variation within
races as there is between them. As such race can hardly carry a biological effect (any more
than being a lawyer can carry—i.e., cause—a biological effect, in spite of the fact that being
a lawyer might be correlated with some biological outcomes).
2. Where the essentializing heuristic comes from is still a matter of considerable contro-
versy. As noted, Medin (1989) sees it as a domain-general phenomenon. Carey (1995) too
suggests a domain-general origin but links essentializing to language, specifically the fact that
language forces us to put sets of similar things into categories. Others, particularly Atran
(1990), argue that essentialist reasoning is initially part of a living-kind module (sometimes
called a folk biological module) and only later is it extended via analogy to other domains. I
have presented evidence that the developmental data do not support this claim (Hirschfeld
1995). Keil (1994) provides a key to an alternative account of essentialism's origins. He
proposes a model of cognitive architecture in which a set of innate modes of construal come
to be associated with a specific domain of the world but are not intrinsically associated with
these domains. The essentializing heuristic might be one of these "free-floating" modes of
construal. The issue, however, is not resolved.
3. I say "later developing" because there is little reason to believe that prior to the age of
overseas exploration, people encountered individuals whose morphology was marked by
differences that we now think of as racial (van den Berghe 1981).
4. Aries is also associated with the claim that prior to the 17th century people did not
distinguish childhood from adulthood. Clearly images of childhood vary considerably across
cultures, but there is no compelling evidence to doubt that all cultures recognize a period of
immaturity and spectacular growth in competence.
5. Three- and five-year-olds were tested because other studies have shown that the
preschool years are the period in which essentializing in other domains emerges and the
period in which notions of kindhood are much elaborated. It thus makes sense to explore
whether racial essentializing emerges and whether human kinds are particularly elaborated
during this time.
6. Children were drawn from preschools in the Ann Arbor area. Ann Arbor is an over-
whelmingly white and middle-class community, and there was no indication that the racial
distribution of children who participated in the study differed from that of the community at
large. In any event, no attempt was made to include or exclude children by race or ethnicity.
Indeed, no attempt was made to record the children's race or ethnicity.
7. For decades physical anthropologists collected detailed skull measurements in an effort
to develop coherent categories based on anthropometics. These classifications often failed to
correspond with subsequent classifications based on internal properties like the genes that
determine blood groups, leading many to conclude that racial classifications (which seek to
capture in a single system of classification both internal and external attributes) lack a
scientific basis (Brace 1964; Molnar 1992). Nonetheless, it is apparent that variations in body
type, size, and proportion are inherited qualities, being complex adaptations to environmental
conditions. As Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza note, "external body features, such as skin
color, and body size and shape, are highly subject to the influence of natural selection due
to [genetic adaptation to variations in) climate" (1995:115). That inherited patterns of
variation in body type are of less social importance to most of us living in North America than
inherited patterns of variation in skin color reveals little about how much such information
beckons the attention of a observer. If the "playing field" is flat—if all patterned variation in
external appearance are equally demanding of attention—then there is no reason why
children should reason more deeply about differences in skin color than body-build.
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